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Abstract: The approach of the international community to the surrounding 
waters has so far been inscribed in a logic of colonization and acquiring new 
territories in the name of national interest. The greater number of the earth’s oceans 
are situated beyond the seashore or border of particular States and territories and 
the paucity of information concerning the oceans in the past has generated conflicts 
among States. In this context, there is a necessity and legal burden on States to 
fashion out ways and means of managing the ocean commons beyond national 
jurisdiction. Recently, world governments met in New York for the First Session 
of the United Nations Preparatory Committee to discuss the elements of a new 
international treaty to protect biodiversity in oceans beyond national jurisdiction 
and report back in 2017 to the United Nations General Assembly. Discussing this 
momentous process to protect the high seas, this article hopes to address some of 
the gaps in the management of the ocean commons and raise public awareness 
of some critical issues facing the ocean commons governance. Since the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, is the constitution 
of the seas, this article examines the UNCLOS provisions related to ocean 
management. The focus also shifts to what constitutes ocean and global commons; 
the legal regime of ocean commons and the role of dispute settlement mechanisms 
articulated under UNCLOS, with a discussion on the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biodiversity in the areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ).
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I. Introduction
The initial question to be asked in an article of this nature is why ocean 
commons management is so important as to deserve attention? After reviewing 
more than 100 earlier studies, a new research, published in the journal Conser-
vation Letters,1 indicates that 30~40 percent of the oceans need protection from 
exploitation and harm in order to best conserve biodiversity and ecosystems. 
This will be impossible in practice without high seas marine protected areas 
(MPAs). Earlier in 2012 2 the world leaders committed to deciding whether to 
begin negotiations on a new agreement to conserve and protect marine life on the 
high seas.3 In June 2015, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) took an 
important step and adopted a resolution to begin negotiations on this important and 
much needed international treaty. Consequently, from March 28 to April 8, 2016, 
the first United Nations Preparatory Committee Session was held in New York to 
chart the road map for a new international treaty to conserve maritime biodiversity 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). The international concern and efforts 
to institute and establish a strong universally acceptable legal framework could 
only be attributed to the global acknowledgment of the important place which the 
oceans occupy in daily activities of humans. 
The struggle by the States of the world to acquire new maritime spaces, with 
a passion comparable to the colonization periods, can only be explained on the 
ground of the realization of nations of the world of the vast economic and political 
advantages inherent in their ability to control the ocean commons. The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), promulgated in the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay in 1982, allows States 
to exercise sovereign rights over the seas and oceans.4 Under UNCLOS, States can 
appropriate maritime spaces by claiming Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and 
extend their continental shelves beyond the 200 nautical miles of the EEZ up to a 
1　   Bethan C. O’Leary, Marit Winther-Johnson, John M. Bainbridge, Jemma Aitken, Julie 
P. Hawkins and Callum M. Roberts, Effective Coverage Targets for Ocean Protection, 
Conservation Letters, 2016, at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12247/pdf, 
12 July 2016.
2　  The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (the Rio +20 Summit), 2012. 
3　  United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio +20, The Future We Want, 
June 2012, para. 162.
4　  Olivier Dubuquoy and Edouard Gaudot, The Ocean: From Colonized Territory to Global 
Nation, Green European Journal, Vol. 12, 2016, at http://www.greeneuropeanjournal.
eu/7945-2/, 24 October 2016.
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maximum of 350 nautical miles. Thus, EEZs have drastically carved up the oceans, 
now covering a third of their total area.
However, the boundary of the ocean commons is largely unobserved. The 
ocean has become the new frontier in the globalized race for fossil energy, which 
was traditionally carried out on the land. This has occasioned conflicts and wars, 
which, if not handled properly, would escalate beyond manageable proportions. 
Dubuquoy and Gaudot argue that areas of dispute have emerged as a result of 
maritime border extension. In their own words,
These new borders also trigger old reflexes. If a border has come to delimit a 
sovereign area, this implies that the territory cannot come under a competing 
sovereignty. There is an exclusive right of exploitation. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), “[c]rude oil production from existing 
deposits, situated mainly on land or in shallow coastal waters, will drop by 
two thirds between 2011 and 2035.” This decrease, according to the IEA, 
may be compensated, but only by replacing the current oil fields with the new 
deposits.5
The consequence of the above is the emergence of volatility and tension in 
disputed areas containing rich deposit of oil and gas. The commons are resources 
governed by legal systems that enable sharing and collective management. This 
article urges cooperation among States of the world, as it is the only appropriate 
response to tensions and disputes in the ocean commons. The ocean commons 
represent the open sea areas which are beyond national jurisdiction and fall outside 
countries’ EEZs, covering nearly two thirds of the ocean’s surface. Countries should 
cooperate to fashion out innovative approach to achieve efficient and sustainable 
management of the ocean commons resources and biodiversity conservation in 
marine areas that do not fall under the responsibility of any one country.6 Problems 
5　  Olivier Dubuquoy and Edouard Gaudot, The Ocean: From Colonized Territory to Global 
Nation, Green European Journal, Vol. 12, 2016, at http://www.greeneuropeanjournal.
eu/7945-2/, 24 October 2016.
6　  Birdlife South Africa, Report Workshop on Seabed Bycatch Mitigation in China’s Tuna 
Longline Fisheries, Shanghai, China, 17 April 2015, at http://www.commonoceans.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/common_oceans/docs/BLI_ChinaWorkshopReport17Apr2015.
pdf, 12 July 2016; FAO, Report of the Second Project Steering Committee: Sustainable 
Management of Tuna Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation in ABNJ, Rome, Italy, 28-30 
July 2015, at http://www.commonoceans.org/fileadmin/user_upload/common_oceans/docs/
ABNJ-Tuna-2015-PSC.pdf, 12 July 2016.
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usually arise within the use and management of ocean commons concerning sea life 
and pollution, thus, the protection of the ocean commons from harm, also requires 
management of coastal and land-based activities on behalf of the global commons.7
The term “global commons” refers to resource domains or areas that are 
situated outside of the political reach of any country. Under international law, there 
are four global commons: the high seas, the atmosphere, the Antarctica and the 
outer space. These have been guided by the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind – the open access doctrine or the mare liberum (free sea for everyone) in 
the case of the high seas. Despite attempts by individuals, national governments 
and international bodies to create property rights or other forms of control over 
most natural resources, the concept of the global commons has remained an 
exception. As pointed out elsewhere, access to some of these resources found 
within the global commons, except for a few like fisheries, has been difficult, but 
modern technological invention and advancement of science have made access to 
the resources of the global commons easier, resulting in increased activities in these 
resource domains.8 Unfortunately, there is no effective laws or policies to manage 
and regulate most of these activities. 
The sanctity of the ocean commons must be maintained via international 
law, which should enforce systematic criminal prosecution on ocean poachers, on 
entities whether legal or illegal, that engage in activities detrimental to the ocean 
commons. The oceans must be sustainably managed for the benefit of all mankind 
and future generations yet unborn. Sadly, there is no international legal framework 
in place that can holistically protect the ocean commons from human activities. It 
is hoped that the ongoing development of a new treaty by the United Nations could 
help close the gap. 
In this connection, it should be noted that the first session of the Preparatory 
Committee on the elements of a draft text of an international legally binding instru-
ment under the UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
7　  Boyce Thorne-Miller, The Living Ocean: Understanding and Protecting Marine Biodiver-
sity, Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1999; Cyrillede Klemm and Clare Shine, Biological 
Diversity Conservation and the Law: Legal Mechanism for Conserving Species and 
Ecosystems, Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1993; Richard L. Wallace ed., The Marine 
Mammal Commission Compendium of Selected Treaties, International Agreements and 
Other Relevant Documents on Marine Resources, Wildlife and Environment, Washington 
D.C.: Marine Mammal Commission, 1997.
8　   Charles S. Colgan, The Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics: An Introduction and 
Invitation, Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2014, Article 8, December 2014, 
at http://cbe.miis.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=joce, 12 July 2016.
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biodi-versity of the ABNJ was convened from 28 March to 8 April 2016 at UN 
Headquarters in New York. Meeting in plenary and informal working group 
settings, the Committee considered: the scope of an international legally binding 
instrument and its relationship with other instruments; guiding approaches and 
principles; marine genetic resources, including questions on benefit-sharing; area-
based management tools, including MPAs; environmental impact assessments; 
and capacity building and marine technology transfer. The session agreed to 
a procedural roadmap outlining the structure of PrepCom 2, and on having a 
Chair’s summary of meeting and an indicative list of issues circulated during the 
intersessional period, to facilitate preparations for PrepCom 2. Several participants 
praised the pace and depth of the discussions, and the constructive spirit that 
marked the beginning of a formal process expected to lead to the adoption of a new 
UNCLOS implementing agreement on deep-sea biodiversity.9
This article examines the most important geo-political question facing the 
international community today, and then explores how we should manage and 
govern the oceans outside national jurisdiction, in order to use them sustainably and 
ensure their potentials forever, for the benefit of all mankind and future generations 
yet unborn. This article further probes the following themes: the definition of 
ocean commons and global commons; the legal regime of ocean commons; dispute 
settlement and ocean commons; the South China Sea arbitration case; managing the 
ocean commons which naturally throws up the issue regarding the conservation and 
sustainable use of the oceans; biological diversity of ABNJ.
II. Legal Regime of Ocean Commons
The ocean commons for long served as a base of economic sustenance and 
political power for many States and shaped the future of countries by determining 
the use and control of the sea and its resources.10 History is replete with cases of 
disputes within the ocean commons, which in modern period have escalated to 
unenviable heights.11 This is hardly unexpected given the rise in over-exploitation, 
9　   Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), Vol. 25, No. 106, 11 April 2016, at http://www.iisd.ca/
vol25/enb25106e.html, 12 July 2016.
10　 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, reprint, London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965.
11　 James C. F. Wang, Handbook on Ocean Politics and Law, New York: Greenwood Press, 
1992, pp. 107~142.
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overfishing and depletion of natural resources of the oceans as well as human 
activities that cause pollution and climate change in the oceans, which has been 
likened to the “Tragedy of the Commons”.12 With this scenario, countries now feel 
the need to cooperate and negotiate regional and international laws and regulations 
for the peaceful management of the ocean commons beyond national jurisdiction. 
The United Nations and its subunits have played a very crucial role in drafting, 
negotiating and securing the ratification of numerous multilateral trade treaties and 
international agreements that govern the ocean commons.13 Presently, a number 
of legal and institutional frameworks exist to deal with the management of the 
ocean commons. It is noteworthy that parts of the UNCLOS are dedicated to the 
management of the world’s oceans and various components of the Antarctica. 
Despite some existing institutional and regulatory frameworks addressing natural 
resource issues in the ocean commons, fundamental gaps and inconsistencies still 
exist, which require immediate attention. An important legal issue that must be 
addressed is the severe fragmentation of legal regulatory frameworks governing 
the ocean commons. There is also a problem of not having an umbrella or single 
institution developing and coordinating policies for existing or new issues 
associated with natural resource exploration or exploitation of the ocean commons. 
The third gap is the lack of regulatory standards for emerging issues and activities, 
such as bioprospecting, which involves rights and processes regarding the access 
to the genetic resources and the sharing of benefits arising from the use of these 
resources. It is with these gaps in mind that the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) established an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study 
issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
12   Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, Vol. 162, Issue 3859,1968, pp. 
1243~1248.
13      These conventions, treaties and agreements governing the ocean commons mainly include:
UNCLOS, 1982; Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1992; Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 1973; International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946; Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 1982, Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
1995; Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 
1980; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter (London Convention 1972 or LC’ 72); International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); International Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants; Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Land-Based Activities, 1995.
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beyond areas of national jurisdiction.14
Global management of the ocean commons has taken two different approaches 
over the past century. One approach began with a focus on the legal issues 
pertaining to international shipping. For centuries, or perhaps even millennia, 
shipping has been the main way that goods are transported internationally. Even 
now, 95 percent of all international trade as measured by weight and two-thirds as 
measured by volume is transported on the ocean by ships.15 Since the high seas do 
not belong to any sovereign State, rules about conduct on the open ocean can only 
be implemented by international agreements. Initial efforts to govern ocean spaces 
involved issues of liability and salvage rights at sea, followed by rules on assistance 
to ships on the high seas. These evolved over time into agreements to increase the 
level of safety on ships, with an increasing concern (especially in the wake of the 
Titanic disaster) for those who work or travel on them. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) is the international institution that addresses these issues.
The second approach involved attention to the resources of the ocean. 
Beginning in the 1970s, with an increase in global concern about environmental 
damage, the focus shifted to the prevention and mitigation of ocean pollution. 
In addition to, and intersecting with, existing regulatory institutions under the 
IMO are those created by the UNCLOS and occasioned by the international legal 
changes stemming from it. The fisheries is another important ocean resource. 
Collective action to protect fisheries began in earnest in the mid-twentieth century, 
with another wave of fisheries organizations created in the 1980s.These institutions 
are numerous but narrowly focused. Though they have had difficulty in preventing 
global overfishing, they have evolved to address emerging governance issues. 
The UNCLOS is an international agreement resulting from the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place between 1973 
and 1982. The UNCLOS came into force on November 16, 1994. It provides 
14　 In its sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly held on 23 January 2015, the Ad Hoc 
Open-ended Informal Working Group re-affirmed the commitment in paragraph 162 of 
the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20 to 22 June 2012, entitled “The Future We Want”, 
as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/288 of 27 July 2012. In the 
document, the heads of State and Government committed to address, on an urgent basis, 
building on the work of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group, the issue of 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of ABNJ, including by 
taking a decision on the development of an international instrument under the UNCLOS.
15　 Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press,2001, p. 4.
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a regulatory framework for the use of the world’s seas and oceans, inter alia, 
to ensure the conservation and equitable usage of resources and the marine 
environment and to ensure the protection and preservation of the living resources of 
the sea. UNCLOS also addresses other issues such as sovereignty, rights of usage 
in maritime zones and navigational rights.16 It contains a section on environmental 
protection, requiring all States “to protect and preserve the marine environment.”17
The World Commission on Environment and Development, established by 
the UNCED in 1972, published a report entitled “Our Common Future” in 1987, 
where the importance of protecting the ocean was recognized. In 1992, world 
governments met again to discuss the global environment. This resulted in the 
“Rio Declaration” which establishes principles, and “Agenda 21”, a plan of action 
for addressing serious issues of environment and human development, including 
degradation of marine systems. One of the outcomes of the 1992 Conference 
was the Convention on Biological Diversity, a comprehensive treaty, addressing 
both marine and terrestrial ecosystems,18 and establishing a framework within 
which biodiversity can be protected. However, each member State is given much 
discretion on whether, when, and how to implement it.19
Prior to the 1992 Conference, a global treaty – the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – was established 
to protect individual species that are in trouble. These species include those 
found in the oceans which are currently poorly protected, largely because of little 
knowledge about the status of most of them. Of all the international conventions 
and agreements governing the management of ocean commons beyond national 
jurisdiction, UNCLOS remains the grundnorm. There is a common perception that 
these legal agreements would facilitate the attainment of a healthy, productive and 
resilient ocean for sustainable development. The United Nations in the Rio +20 
Declaration “The Future We Want,” stressed the importance of:
the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and seas and of their 
resources for sustainable development, including through their contributions 
16　 As of 26 October 2016, 168 States have ratified, acceded to, or succeeded to, UNCLOS. For 
the full text and status of UNCLOS, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/, 26 October 2016.
17　 UNCLOS, Article 192.
18　 Boyce Thorne-Miller, The Living Ocean: Understanding and Protecting Marine Biodiver-
sity, Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1999.
19　 Cyrille de Klemm and Clare Shine, Biological Diversity, Conserving Species and Ecosys-
tems, Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1993.
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to poverty eradication, sustained economic growth, food security and creation 
of sustainable livelihoods and decent work, while at the same time protecting 
biodiversity and the marine environment and addressing the impacts of climate 
change.20
As described above, efforts are being made by the United Nations General 
Assembly to develop a globally legal instrument that will work with UNCLOS 
to press for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
in ABNJ. However, it is argued, despite these efforts, we are far from achieving 
the goal of “a healthy, productive and resilient ocean.”21 Failures of the legal 
regime in the governance of the oceans include lack of compliance and inadequate 
implementation by States; lack of compliance with flag State duties; limited 
investment in collaborative monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; over-reliance 
on sectoral approaches to resource management; limited institutional infrastructure 
for high seas governance; inability to overcome political roadblocks; inequitable 
resource allocations; and ineffective regional cooperation. 
The governance framework for the high seas – that is, the legal rules, political 
processes and institutional structures through which those rules are applied and 
enforced, is based on the UNCLOS. UNCLOS is the only legal instrument that 
holistically sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans 
and seas must be carried out. UNCLOS, together with its two implementing 
agreements, is the dominant legal framework for ocean governance. However, 
UNCLOS also suffers from a number of defects: the sectoral approach adopted 
to manage human activities in the marine environment which are based on the 
regulation of specific industries and human activities, such as fisheries, shipping 
and seabed mining, creates considerable inconsistency in the “timeliness and 
effectiveness of regulation,” since there is a little interplay between the various 
institutions that are mandated to regulate these sectoral activities. This adversely 
impedes the conservation of species, habitats and ecosystems which are the core 
components of biological diversity. In administering the UNCLOS, transparency, 
accountability and compliance-reporting mechanisms are very weak when it 
20　 Jeff Ardon, Elisabeth Druel, Kristina Gjerde, Katherine Houghton, Julien Rochette and 
Sebastian Unger, Advancing Governance of the High Seas, IASS Policy Brief 1/2013, May 
2013.
21　 At http://en.unesco.org/events/towards-sustainable-development-goal-ocean-healthy-
productive-and-resilient-ocean-people, 11 October 2016.
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comes to sectoral management of human activities on the high seas, and only 
few mechanisms exist to assess or manage the cumulative effects of multiple 
industrial activities, together with ocean acidification and warming, on the same 
ocean environment. UNCLOS did not establish a separate secretariat charged with 
monitoring its implementation and promoting its consistent application in state 
practice. It neither established any built-in compliance mechanisms to monitor 
the performance of States and impose sanctions where necessary, such as those 
contained in the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone and 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).22 Instead, 
UNCLOS created three entirely new and separate institutions,23 with specific 
functions and responsibilities of implementing some parts of UNCLOS. The 
other provisions in UNCLOS are left to be implemented either by States acting 
individually and collectively, or through “competent international organizations,” 
agencies and bodies at regional or global levels. We argue that what UNCLOS 
has done has created a proliferation of competent authorities, with overlapping 
and competing mandates, which in reality lack any real regulatory or enforcement 
powers. Compliance to or implementation of the existing international conventions, 
treaties and agreements governing the use and management of the oceans are 
voluntary, in that case, States can easily opt out of issues or measures they do not 
agree with, and their accountability at the global level is near zero. Regulatory 
mechanisms for specific sectors, where available, vary widely in their effectiveness 
and there is inconsistency in the rules set in each sector and how they are applied.24
To sum up, the current legal regime for the management of the human 
activities impacting the oceans is not sufficient to attain a sustainable level and 
equity in resource allocation or to create the conditions for maximizing economic 
benefits from the oceans. We therefore, recommend that while prospecting and 
shopping for a new international treaty, effective implementation of existing 
instruments, bridging of implementation gaps, and strengthening compliance 
and enforcement will contribute to addressing the present challenges. More has 
22    UNCLOS did establish mechanisms for compulsory and binding settlement of disputes, but 
that is to be distinguished from compliance. 
23    The three institutions created by UNCLOS are the International Seabed Authority, the 
ITLOS and the Commission for the Limits of Continental Shelf. Each of these organizations 
is autonomous and has specific, limited responsibilities established by UNCLOS.
24   Global Ocean Commission, From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global 
Ocean, at http://www.some.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GOC_report_2015.
July_2.pdf, 12 July 2016.
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to be done by seeking ways to import modern conservation imperatives into the 
existing governance framework provided by UNCLOS, so that the present path of 
degradation may be moved backward.
Viable solutions to the problems above, also lie in improved surveillance, 
better cooperation between navies, fisheries enforcement agencies, police forces, 
military and regional organizations and the sharing of information regarding non-
military threats. It is also desirable to combine satellite-based vessel detection with 
standard Automatic Identification System (AIS) information from both terrestrial 
and space systems.25 While it is admitted that satellites can contribute to monitoring 
the ocean for illegal activity, interpreting and utilizing the vast amounts of data 
is quite difficult in most circumstances. Also no single country can afford to set 
up a system for maritime surveillance on a global scale.26 In order to improve the 
prevailing situation, many proposals have been put forward: creating a World 
Oceans Organization to function as a global steward of the marine environment and 
to regulate access to its resources,27 and converting Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (RFMOs) into Regional Ocean Management Organizations 
(ROMOs) with the mandate to manage all activities within an ocean basin that 
impact upon the conservation and management of marine living resources and 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The capacities of 
these organizations include the power to establish MPAs on the high seas and 
introduce new legal measures to impose sanctions on States that fail to meet their 
conservation obligations.
Finally, it is believed that an improved legal regime of the ocean commons 
will play a crucial role in reversing the prevailing deterioration in the health of 
the global ocean and in developing sustainable future. Tacit implementation of 
the existing legal and policy instruments, strengthened compliance and better 
enforcement will definitely contribute to addressing ongoing challenges and will 
therefore, form an important part of any suite of recommendations. Whatever 
25    Global Ocean Commission, From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global 
Ocean, at http://www.some.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GOC_report_2015.
July_2.pdf, 12 July 2016.
26　 Global Ocean Commission, From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global 
Ocean, at http://www.some.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GOC_report_2015.
July_2.pdf, 12 July 2016.
27　 WBGU, World in Transition: Governing the Marine Heritage, p. 253, at http://www.wbgu.
de/fileadmin/templates/dateien/veroeffentlichungen/hauptgutachten/hg2013/wbgu_hg2013_
en.pdf, 24 October 2016.
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the case maybe, it is desirable to establish a new treaty, taking into account the 
recommendations adopted at the First Session of the UN Preparatory Committee 
held in 2016. This work must be carefully done so as not to disrupt the balance of 
rights and responsibilities under UNCLOS. Having made this point, it is time to ask 
whether a fundamental change of approach is needed to ensure that sustainability 
is placed at the forefront of collective management of the global ocean commons. 
And if so, how that would be achieved? This is an open-ended issue needs further 
exploration. 
III. Dispute Settlement and Ocean Commons 
In this section, we will discuss dispute settlement and ocean commons, and 
the links between the two and the Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea 
Disputes. Dispute settlement raises the issue of laws, norms and governances.28 
For Ostrom, the conflict resolution mechanisms remain an integral part of 
“making institutions involved in the governance of common pool resources truly 
robust in performance.”29 The European Commission states that governance is 
an institutional affair and refers to exercise of power and connotes actions by 
executive bodies, assemblies and judicial bodies.30 In this context, it means that 
judicial bodies such as courts and tribunals qualify as institutions that play a role 
in dispute settlement concerning the ocean commons. Since conventions and 
agreements that are properly negotiated and legally executed have the force of law 
and can be enforced through judicial and non-judicial means of dispute settlement, 
the link between dispute settlement, the ocean commons and Sino-Philippine 
Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes becomes apparent. This article, therefore, 
argues expressly that ocean commons is no exception to this trend, with the parties 
concerned having the right to access to the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the “ITLOS” or the “Tribunal”) under certain 
circumstances. Dispute settlement mechanisms, in this sense, have a role to play in 
the ocean commons governance. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms 
28     Anshuman Chakraborty, Dispute Settlement under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and Its Role in Oceans Governance (LL.M Thesis), New Zealand: Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2006.
29　  Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Ac-
tion, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 181.
30　  European Commission, “What is Governance?”, at http://europa.eu.int/comm./governance/
index_en.htm, 9 September 2016.
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depends on the willingness of the States to use them in the settlement of ocean 
commons and maritime disputes.
Dispute settlement mechanisms can also be applied in the management of 
ocean commons beyond national jurisdiction. This brings us to the dispute settle-
ment provisions as contained in the UNCLOS.31 The UNCLOS established 
judicial bodies to be known and called the ITLOS, an arbitral tribunal for the 
law of the sea and a special arbitral tribunal32 to adjudicate disputes concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Convention, which includes disputes 
related to the ocean commons. The ITLOS has jurisdiction over any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, and over all matters 
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on 
the Tribunal.33 The Tribunal is open to State Parties to the UNCLOS. It is also 
open to entities other than States Parties, “in any case expressly provided for 
in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring 
jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case.”34
Part XV of the UNCLOS creates a comprehensive system for the settlement 
of disputes which may arise with respect to the interpretation or application of 
the Convention. It requires States Parties to settle the disputes between them 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention by peaceful means 
indicated in the Charter of the United Nations.35 However, if parties to a dispute 
fail to reach a settlement by peaceful means of their own choice, they should 
resort to the compulsory dispute settlement procedures entailing binding decisions, 
subject to limitations and exceptions contained in the Convention. The mechanism 
established by the Convention provides for four alternative means for the settlement 
of disputes: the ITLOS, the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VII to the Convention,36 and a special 
Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII to the Convention. A 
State Party is free to choose one or more of these means by a written declaration 
to be made under Article 287 of the Convention. If the parties to a dispute have 
not accepted the same settlement procedure, the dispute may be submitted only to 
31　 Annex VII & VIII and Parts XI and XV, UNCLOS.
32　 Annex VII & VIII and Parts XI and XV, UNCLOS.
33　 Statute of the ITLOS, Article 21.
34　 Statute of the ITLOS, Article 20.
35　 UNCLOS, Article 279.
36　 PCA Case No. 2013-19: The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China.
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arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.37
In accordance with the relevant stipulations of its Statute, the ITLOS has 
formed the following chambers: the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the Chamber 
for Fisheries Disputes, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes and the 
Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes. At the request of the parties, the 
Tribunal has also formed special chambers to deal with the Case Concerning 
the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Community) and the Dispute Concerning 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in 
the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire).38 Disputes relating to activities in the 
international seabed area are submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
Tribunal. Any party to a dispute over which the Seabed Disputes Chamber has 
jurisdiction may request the Seabed Disputes Chamber to form an ad hoc chamber 
composed of three members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.39 To date, twelve 
multilateral agreements, which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal, have been 
concluded. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
is mandatory in cases relating to the prompt release of vessels and crews under 
Article 292 of the Convention and to provisional measures pending the constitution 
of an arbitral tribunal under Article 290(5) of the Convention. The Seabed Disputes 
Chamber is competent to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within 
the scope of the activities of the International Seabed Authority.40 The Tribunal 
may also give advisory opinions on legal questions if they are provided for by 
international agreements related to the purposes of the Convention.41 Disputes 
before the Tribunal are instituted either by written application or by notification of a 
special agreement. The procedure to be followed for the conduct of cases submitted 
to the Tribunal is defined in its Statute and Rules.
This article asserts that disputes settlement mechanisms are very pivotal in 
addressing disputes regarding ocean commons. In this area, the ITLOS and other 
bodies established under UNCLOS for this purpose have done a great deal of 
work. To understand the rationale behind the establishment of dispute settlement 
procedures under the UNCLOS, it is pertinent to ask the question whether its 
37　 UNCLOS, Article 287.
38　 ITLOS, Case Nos. 7 &23.
39　 Statute of the ITLOS, Article 36.
40　 UNCLOS, Article 191.
41　 Rules of the ITLOS, Article 138.
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involvement in ocean commons management was one of the intendments of the 
drafters of the Convention. This article answers the question in the affirmative, 
because by establishing dispute settlement bodies, the UNCLOS could be argued to 
have manifested an express intention that ocean commons come within its mandate 
and objective. UNCLOS set out to cure the mischief and conflicts created by the 
significant increase in the use of the ocean commons. The incorporation of dispute 
settlement provisions in the UNCLOS defines the essence of its intention to prevent 
unilateral interpretation of the Convention provisions by States Parties.42 The 
point on the necessity for the establishment of dispute settlement provisions in the 
UNCLOS was made in the following words:
[T]he provision of effective dispute settlement procedures is essential for 
stabilizing and maintaining the compromises necessary for the attainment 
of agreement on a convention … [and] dispute settlement procedures will 
be the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium of the compromise must 
be balanced. Otherwise the compromise will disintegrate rapidly and 
permanently … Effective dispute settlement would also be the guarantee that 
the substance and intention within the legislative language of the convention 
will be interpreted both consistently and equitably.43
The dispute settlement provisions in the UNCLOS is therefore, a substantive 
procedure protecting the rights and freedoms of the parties to the Convention, 
through ITLOS and other judicial bodies.44 It could be further argued that the 
UNCLOS by establishing dispute settlement mechanisms has provided a base for 
international law and legal arrangements for a global ocean commons manage-
ment.45 Dispute settlement bodies, acting as institutions in ocean commons gover-
42     L. B. Sohn, The Importance of the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in Myron H. Nordquist and John Norton Moore 
eds., Entry into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995.
43　 U.N. Document A/CONF.62/WP.9/ADD.1, Memorandum by the President of the Confe-
rence on document A/CONF.62/WP.9, 31 March 1976, p. 122.
44　 Ivan A. Shearer, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and Its Potential 
for Resolving Navigational Disputes, in Donald R. Rothwell and Sam Bateman eds., 
Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000.
45　 Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean 
Governance, London: Routledge, 1996.
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nance, hold the ace to control ocean commons governance at international, regional 
and national levels. According to Miles, at the global level, dispute settlement 
mechanisms constitute a formidable pillar of ocean commons governance. The 
impact that dispute settlement mechanisms under UNCLOS could have on the 
management of ocean commons beyond national jurisdiction could cut across 
various levels as exemplified in disputes and cases referred to and settled by the 
ITLOS since 1997.46
Provisions under UNCLOS for the effective settlement of disputes remain 
an integral part of the governance of coastal and marine spaces. It can be inferred 
from the discussions above that the importance of the role of dispute settlement 
mechanisms in ocean commons management cannot be ignored. Good ocean 
commons management is about having the inclusive institutional structures needed 
to “prevent and adjudicate disputes.”47 This in turn correlates with the basic role 
of ocean commons management, which includes the maintenance of “substantive 
ocean governance laws as the foundation for enhanced policy coordination and 
conflict resolution mechanisms.”48 This is not limited to the international level; 
it also permeates the regional, national and local levels where principles and 
precedents developed at the international levels are applied to ocean commons 
management in diverse ways. Disputes and cases settled under the dispute 
settlement provisions of Part XV of the UNCLOS provide precedents that could 
shape policy directions of ocean commons management. This article argues that 
the general provisions under Part XV of UNCLOS on non-compulsory dispute 
settlement have a vital role to play in ocean commons management and further 
strengthen the provisions of Section 1, especially Article 280 in this part, which 
gives full freedom to the parties to a dispute to settle it in any peaceful manner of 
their choice.49
Given the above discussions, it is evident that dispute settlement mechanisms 
play a major role not only in the management of ocean commons beyond national 
jurisdiction but in maintaining peace and security in the global commons. Specifi-
46　 To date, 25 cases have been submitted to the ITLOS, see https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-
of-cases/ for details.
47    Sue Nichols, David Monahan and Michael Sutherland, Good Governance of Canada’s 
Offshore and Coastal Zone: Towards an Understanding of the Marine Boundary Issues, 
Geomatica, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, p. 415.
48　 At http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/publicomment/novgencomment/fry_
comment.pdf, 18 September 2016.
49　 UNCLOS, Article 280.
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cally, dispute settlement mechanisms could, in the long run, positively impact 
ocean commons management in the following ways: regulating and allocating 
resources; delimiting maritime boundaries; strengthening regimes and institutions; 
interpreting and clarifying the law and developing rules; facilitating cooperation; 
reducing tensions, ironing out problems, maintaining peace and security; ensuring 
compliance with and enforcing international law; and managing multiple ocean use 
conflicts.50
This article notes the Philippines v. China Arbitration,51 initiated pursuant 
to Annex VII to the UNCLOS. Philippines requested the Arbitral Tribunal to 
invalidate China’s maritime claims.52 The Philippines contends that the “U-shaped 
line” claimed by China is invalid because it violates the UNCLOS provisions about 
EEZs and territorial seas. It says that because most of the features in the South 
China Sea, such as most of the Spratly Islands, cannot sustain life, they cannot 
be given their own continental shelf as defined in the Convention. China refuses 
to participate in the arbitration, stating that several treaties with the Philippines 
stipulate that bilateral negotiations should be used to resolve border disputes. It 
also accuses Philippines of violating the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea, voluntarily made in 2002 between ASEAN and China, which 
also provides bilateral negotiations as the means of resolving border and other 
disputes. China issued a position paper in December 2014, arguing the dispute 
was not subject to arbitration because it was ultimately a matter of sovereignty, 
not exploitation rights. Specifically, China raised two main objections. First, the 
arbitral subject-matter is not within the scope of “interpretation or application” of 
UNCLOS. Second, the Philippines violates the duty to negotiate in regard to the 
subject-matter of this dispute, when it initiated the arbitration.
In its position paper, China avers that:
The unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines will 
50　Anshuman Chakraborty, Dispute Settlement under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and Its Role in Oceans Governance (LL.M Thesis), New Zealand: Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2006, pp. 46~73.
51    PCA Case No. 2013-19: The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, an 
Arbitration before the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 UNCLOS 
between the Republic of Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.
52　 The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China is a arbitration case concer-
ning the legality of China’s “U-shaped line” claim over the South China Sea under 
UNCLOS. On October 29, 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that it has jurisdiction over the 
case. 
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not change the history and fact of China’s sovereignty over the South China 
Sea Islands and the adjacent waters nor will it shake China’s resolve and 
determination to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; 
nor will it affect the policy and position of China to resolve the relevant 
disputes by direct negotiations and work together with other States in the 
region to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.
However, China’s refusal did not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal from proceeding 
with the case. On October 29, 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal of the Philippines v. 
China Arbitration Case ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the case and found the 
Philippines’ submissions admissible. Wu Shicun, president and senior researcher 
of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies described the Tribunal’s 
decision as “illogical, unfair, and risks escalating tensions in the South China 
Sea.”53 Again, UNCLOS is at the centre of the case and China maintains that the 
Arbitral Tribunal did not follow the provisions of UNCLOS on “dispute settlement 
mechanisms, including arbitration, to ensure a fair and effective implementation 
of the Convention…”54 China rejected the ruling and had earlier on submitted a 
Note Verbale, rejecting the claims made by the Philippines in the Notification and 
Statement of Claim, and calling on the Philippines to resolve the dispute through 
bilateral negotiations. China insists that the Arbitral Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in 
the case. China is unlikely to abide by any final outcome of the matter.
The link between the Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes 
and ocean commons can be found in policy options such as maritime security. 
Thousands of vessels, from fishing boats to coastal patrols and naval ships, ply 
the East and South China Seas. Increased use of the disputed waters by China and 
its neighbours heightened the risk that miscalculations by sea captains or political 
leaders could trigger an armed conflict, which the United States could be drawn 
into through its military commitments to its allies Japan and the Philippines. The 
South China Sea issue is not just about competing claims, it is also about peace and 
stability in the region. Both parties involved must ensure strong commitment to 
safeguarding the region’s security so as to enable maritime and economic activities 
to flow in the ocean commons of the region. In addition, policy experts believe 
53　 Wu Shicun, The South China Sea Arbitration Case Could Exacerbate Disputes in the South 
China Sea, at http://nl.china-embassy.org/eng/hldt/t1374516.htm, 18 September 2016.
54　 Wu Shicun, The South China Sea Arbitration Case Could Exacerbate Disputes in the South 
China Sea, at http://nl.china-embassy.org/eng/hldt/t1374516.htm, 18 September 2016.
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that a crisis management system for the region is crucial. A range of preventive 
measures could be put in place to ease regional tensions and de-escalate military 
confrontation in the South China Sea.
There are other links between the Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South 
China Sea Disputes and ocean commons within the region. These are economic, 
diplomatic and resource sharing issues. The disputes have resulted in claimants in 
the South China Sea and also East China Sea not cooperating on the development 
of ocean commons resources, which include fisheries, petroleum and gas. A 
resource sharing agreement could include bilateral patrolling mechanisms, which 
could deter potential sources of conflict like illegal fishing and skirmishes arising 
from oil and gas exploration. Hence, more diplomatic and economic collaborations 
between the parties to the dispute could mitigate risk by sharing economic benefits. 
IV. Managing the Ocean Commons 
The discussions in the foregoing sections of this article show that sustainable 
management is needed for the earth’s most important common resource, the ocean 
commons.55 Sometime in 1968, Garrett Hardin56 argued that when a resource is 
held jointly, it is in individuals’ self-interest to deplete it; that is to say, people will 
tend to undermine their collective long-term interest by over-exploiting rather than 
protecting that asset. This tragedy propounded by Garrett Hardin is now starring 
us boldly in the face, resulting in serious and irreversible damage to a resource that 
covers more than half of the planet. 
In order to avoid this tragedy, it is necessary for institutions to formulate rules 
to balance the selfish interests of individuals against the long-term interests of all 
users. There are worrying developments, ranging from the mining of the seabed 
in the high seas within the ocean commons to the collapse of global marine fish 
stocks. It is becoming evident that decades-long damage to the oceans are now 
spreading to the terrestrial environment. This tragedy has been foretold. The ocean 
commons will face the “tragedy of the commons” – the depletion of commonly 
held property by individual users. However, the unrecognized consequence of the 
tragedy is that the cost of damaging the system of ocean commons is not fully 
borne by the damage doers. This manifests itself vividly in fishing, where in the 
55　 Leaders, The Tragedy of the High Seas, The Economist, 22 February 2014, pp. 10~12.
56　 Leaders, The Tragedy of the High Seas, The Economist, 22 February 2014, pp. 10~12.
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course of over-exploitation, invasive species of many kinds are moved around the 
world by human activities and often cause irreversible damage to the oceans each 
year. In addition, manufacturers and consumers dump harmful and toxic wastes into 
the oceans, polluting them on the surface and the sea floor. To protect the ocean 
commons, it is sometimes necessary to assign private property rights over them, 
thus, giving users a bigger stake in their long term health.57
International management of the ocean commons involves generally, the 
international institutions and the legal framework concerned in the management of 
the oceans. Such institutions mainly include: the United Nations, UNEP, UNDP, 
FAO, Office of Legal Affairs, IMO and International Whaling Commission. 
The relevant international agreements include UNCLOS, the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Convention 
on Biological Diversity, Regional Seas Conventions,58 MARPOL,59 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, UN Fish Stocks Agreement,60 Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. Some of these agreements have regulatory 
connection, while others have only partial connection to the management of the 
ocean commons. There are also other ocean based institutions with responsibility 
for managing the ocean commons: Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf, 
International Seabed Authority, ITLOS and FAO Regional Fishery Bodies. 
However, the “dysfunctional policies and institutions governing the high 
seas need radical reform.”61 For example, managing and regulating fishing is, 
57    This is being tried in coastal and archipelagic States’ EEZs, but it does not apply on the 
high seas. Under international law, fishing there is open to all and minerals count as “the 
common heritage of mankind.”
58　  Framework of a legally binding Regional Seas Conventions that aim to protect the marine 
environment. Also note the UNEP Regional Seas Convention – The Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean 
(Barcelona Convention) 1976.
59　 MARPOL 73/78 is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 
1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. MARPOL is short for marine pollution and 73/78 
short for the years 1973 and 1978.
60　 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 1995, came into force in 2001. Its full title is 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995.
61　 Leaders, The Tragedy of the High Seas, The Economist, 22 February 2014, pp. 10~12.
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undoubtedly, one of the biggest problems in ocean commons management. 
Overfishing causes more damage to the oceans than other human activities. The 
World Bank reports that the mismanagement of fisheries costs US $50 billion or 
more a year.62 Combating illegal fishing poses a challenge for the regional fishery 
bodies, because they have little or no financial capacity to combat illegal fishermen, 
and little statistics on the number of vessels operating in their waters for the lack of 
a global register of fishing boats. Also, the rules of these regional fishery bodies are 
only binding on their members, which means that non-members can decide not to 
comply with the rules. 
Institutions managing the ocean commons are weak and dysfunctional, and 
lack the human and financial resources to check overfishing. Such institutions 
are fragmented into fishing, mining and shipping. However, there is no particular 
organization whose main duty is to manage the oceans as a whole. In this context, 
it is highly suggested that regional bodies should be financially empowered so as 
to ensure effective enforcement of their rules. Furthermore, an entirely new United 
Nations body should be set up to govern the ocean commons as a whole. Last 
but not the least, everyone that is entitled to use the ocean commons should be 
permitted to have a part to play or have a say in running them.63
Closely linked to the issue of management of the oceans is the question of 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of ABNJ, which is 
increasingly attracting international attention.64 Scientific information, albeit 
insufficient, reveals the richness and vulnerability of such biodiversity, particularly 
in seamounts, hydrothermal vents and of cold-water corals. And concerns grow 
about the increasing anthropogenic pressure posed by existing and emerging 
activities, such as fishing and bioprospecting, in the deep sea.
The UNCLOS provides that the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
include:
62　 Coral Triangle, Report: World’s Oceans Continue to Suffer from Overfishing’, at http://
iwlearn.net/iw-projects/3591/news/cti-iw-learn/5d5b48d6fd6fe918c1a6108491089e98, 24 
October 2016. 
63    Humans Are Damaging the High Seas – Now the Oceans Are Doing Harm Back, at http://
www.businessinsider.com/humans-are-damaging-the-high-seas--now-the-oceans-are-doing-
harm-back-2015-1, 22 September 2016.
64　59th Session of the General Assembly: In resolution 59/24, the General Assembly 
established an ad hoc open-ended informal working group to study issues relating to ABNJ 
conservation and sustainable use, and called upon States and international organizations to 
take action urgently to address, in accordance with international law, destructive practices 
that have adverse impacts on marine biodiversity and ecosystems.
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(i) the high seas, which mean the water column beyond the EEZ, the territorial 
sea or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State;65 and
(ii) the “Area”, meaning the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.66
The ABNJ are the common oceans that do not fall under the responsibility 
of any one country. An ABNJ Program has been designed to achieve efficient and 
sustainable management of fisheries resources and biodiversity conservation in 
marine areas that do not fall under the responsibility of any one country. In order to 
achieve this goal, the Program is divided into four specific areas:
•	 Sustainable management of tuna fisheries and biodiversity;
•	 Sustainable use of deep-sea living resources and biodiversity;
•	 Ocean partnership for sustainable fisheries and biodiversity conservation;
•	 Strengthening global capacity to effectively manage ABNJ.67
An implementation agreement is necessary to help address these problems 
by providing a mechanism to augment, elaborate, and make operational, general 
provisions of UNCLOS in relation to ABNJ; improve cooperation amongst existing 
institutions, and co-ordinate ecosystem-based governance for the conservation and 
sustainable use of resources and biodiversity in these areas.68 The existing ABNJ 
management framework is mainly sectoral and implemented by different global and 
regional institutions, which highlights the “urgent need for immediate intervention 
for integrated, ecosystem-based management of ABNJ to protect marine ecosystems 
and biodiversity and to sustainably utilize resources of the ocean commons to 
achieve socio-economic benefits while avoiding adverse environmental impacts.”69 
In this sense, improved governance and management of oceans beyond national 
jurisdictions includes ways and means for improved implementation of existing 
instruments and addressing equity concerns.70
In order to protect our marine resources, there must be a move towards an 
65　 UNCLOS, Article 86.
66　 UNCLOS, Article 1.
67　  At http://www.commonoceans.org/home/en/, 1 November 2016
68     Sharelle Hart, Element of a Possible Implementation Agreement to UNCLOS for the Con-
servation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Juris-
diction, Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 2008, at https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_
marine_paper_4.pdf, 12 July 2016.
69　 At https://globaloceanforum.com/areas-of-focus/areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction/, 12 July 
2016.
70　 MarjoVierros, Governance of Marine Area Beyond National Jurisdictions, at http://ourworl
d.unu.edu/en/governance-of-marine-areas-beyond-national-jurisdictions, 12 July 2016.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2016 No. 2)78
ecosystem-based management approach to oceans and fisheries management.71 
Several articles have captured the global diminishing of the ocean commons 
resources – large ocean predators such as tunas, billfish, sharks and sea turtles;72 
decline of predator diversity;73 critically endangered species of deep sea fishes;74 
overexploitation and depletion of fish resources;75 and destruction of seamount 
and coral ecosystems.76 While routing for the move towards an ecosystem-based 
approach in the management of ocean commons, it is saddening that the ABNJ are 
subject to fragmented and inconsistent management relying mostly on sector-based 
and single-species approaches, which have proven ineffective in ensuring the health 
and integrity of marine ecosystems. As a result of this, vulnerable ecosystems 
beyond national jurisdiction remain unprotected to the point that several are now 
over-exploited or depleted. Recent global and regional assessments of the marine 
environment, such as reports prepared by the Pew Oceans Commission,77 the U.S. 
Commission on Ocean Policy78 and the U.K. Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution,79 have all taken note of these trends. These reports have recommended 
the ecosystem-based management approach “to address the full range of ocean 
71    Arlo H. Hemphill and George Shillinger, Casting the Net Broadly: Ecosystem-based 
Management Beyond National Jurisdiction, Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Vol. 7, 
Issue 1, Fall 2006, pp. 56~59.
72　  Ransom A. Myers and Boris Worm, Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Commu-
nities, Nature, Vol. 423, No. 6937, 2003, pp. 208~283; James R. Spotila, Richard D. Reina, 
Anthony C. Steyermark, Pamela T, Plotkin and Frank V. Paladino, Pacific Leatherback 
Turtles Face Extinction, Nature, Vol. 405, No. 6786, 2000, pp. 529~530.
73　 Boris Worm, Marcel Sandow, Andreas Oschlies, Heike K. Lotze and Ransom A. Myers, 
Global Patterns of Predator Diversity in the Open Oceans, Science, Vol. 309, Issue 5739, 
2005, pp. 1365~1369.
74　 Jennifer A. Devine, Krista D. Baker and Richard L. Haedrich, Fisheries: Deep-sea Fishes 
Quality as Endangered, Nature, Vol. 439, No. 7072, 2006, p. 29.
75 　Jean-Jacques Maguire, Michael Sissenwine, Jorge Csirke and Richard Grainger, The State 
of the World Highly Migratory, Straddling and Other High Seas Fishery Fish Stocks and 
Associated Species, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 495, 2006, at http://www.fao.org/
newsroom/common/ecg/1000302/en/paper.pdf, 12 July 2016.
76　 Henry Nicholls, Marine Conservation: Sink or Swim, Nature, Vol. 432, No. 7013, 2004,pp. 
12~14.
77　  Pew Oceans Commission, America’s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change, 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2003/06/02/americas-living-
oceans-charting-a-course-for-sea-change,12 July 2016.
78　 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, at http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.
pdf, 12 July 2016.
79     Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Turning the Tide: Addressing the Impact of 
Fisheries on the Marine Environment, at http://www.rcep.org.uk/fisheries/Turningthetide.
pdf, 12 July 2016.
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uses, inclusive of fisheries.”80
The author asserts that effective protection of the ocean commons environment 
is required in order to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of its resources. 
This involves an integrated governance structure which effectively protects not 
only the interests of individual users but also of the international community as a 
whole. However, currently, ocean commons management is fragmented among a 
number of sectoral and geographically based organizations. This situation creates 
a number of difficulties and gaps, which include those arising from the lack of 
participation in and implementation of relevant legal regimes. Regulatory gaps 
are noticeable in the inadequate coverage of high seas in RFMOs and regional 
conventions on high seas and the lack of coordination and cooperation between 
the fisheries and environmental sectors. There are also substantive gaps due to the 
non-applicability of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement to certain high seas 
fish stocks.81 In addition, no regulatory regime exists for the laying of cables and 
pipelines, military activities, and deep sea tourism.82 All these gaps impede the 
attainment of integrated ecosystem-based governance on the ocean commons, since 
they compromise the ability of the oceans to continue providing vital ecosystem 
services and essential food resources. This calls for immediate actions.
V. Conclusions
The study of the management aspects of the ocean commons beyond national 
jurisdiction has a lineage that connects to a number of topics. The oceans have a 
role in the shaping of nations, economies, and cultures. In the words of Braudel, 
the Mediterranean Sea shaped the renaissance in Europe, opened the way for wide 
exploration of oceans83 and affected people’s perception and acknowledgment of 
80　  Linda Glover and Sylvia Earle eds., Defying Ocean’ End: An Agenda for Action, Washing-
ton D.C.: Island Press, 2004.
81　 Rosemary Rayfuse and Robin M. Warner, Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Legal Basis for an Integrated Cross-sectoral Regime for 
High Seas Governance for the 21st Century, International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2008, pp. 399~421.
82　 Rosemary Rayfuse and Robin M. Warner, Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans 
Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Legal Basis for an Integrated Cross-sectoral Regime for 
High Seas Governance for the 21st Century, International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2008, pp. 399~421.
83　Charles S. Colgan, The Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics: An Introduction and 
Invitation, Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2014, Article 8, December 2014, 
p. 3, at http://cbe.miis.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=joce, 12 July 2016.
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the economic and political power associated with the seas.
The relationship between human beings and the oceans has come to impact on 
the economic and political yearnings of the countries in the world. In this context, 
discussions emerged at both national and international levels on how international 
law should be used to protect and manage the oceans. The law of the sea had 
primarily been a subject of national and customary law, until the United Nations 
created a new global forum under which a codified international law of the sea 
could be established. 
As discussed previously, the need to think about the seas and ocean resources 
gained momentum, leading to several international actions. This article has 
reviewed the issues relating to the management of ocean commons. Bearing in 
mind the national, regional and international conflicts resulting from such issues, 
the article outlined the path which the international community has taken to address 
the relevant deepening problems. Certainly, the most important issue facing the 
management of ocean commons remains on who controls the natural resources 
and the maritime space beyond national jurisdiction. Another issue is about 
who exercises the military powers over the oceans beyond national jurisdiction. 
Questions of national and international jurisdictions, the issue of property rights for 
mobile resources such as fisheries and transportation routes, and the issue relating 
to the exploitation of fishery and fossil fuel resources remain the leading ones that 
will be revisited. By discussing the problems and challenges related to the ocean 
commons management, the article aims to raise public awareness of the importance 
of the oceans, and therefore, calls on all countries to incorporate the management 
of the ocean commons into their national policies. Ultimately, underlying the study 
of the ocean is the desire to better understand the nature of the socio-ecological 
systems involved, as the ecological health of the oceans is assumed to be coupled 
with the health of the regional or national economies.
A cursory survey of the focus of this article shows that it is difficult to define 
the precise boundaries of inquiry and subject matter appropriate to a topic of this 
nature. However, even if the precise boundaries cannot be established, this article 
has attempted to discuss and define the geography of ocean commons and global 
commons. 
Presently, the ocean commons are governed by a patchwork of international, 
regional and sectoral agreements and treaties which, in some cases, overlap and 
create complicated and complex issues. In some places regulatory gaps exist where 
no one has full authority to act. A typical case in point is the one where some 
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regional seas conventions can establish MPAs, but fail to impose limits on activities 
such as fishing and seabed mining, only because other organizations are responsible 
for managing them. Given this fact, these protected areas cannot exclude activities 
that pose some of the most significant risks to marine life. Except the international 
commission which governs the Southern Ocean, there is no mechanism in existence 
to establish fully protected marine reserves in the high seas. Without a strong 
new treaty, human activities will continue to imperil or threaten the ocean and the 
earth. By timely developing a treaty, we can protect the biodiversity of the ocean 
commons for generations yet unborn. The United Nations has taken a step toward 
a new treaty, but much work remains to be done. The just-concluded First Session 
of the Preparatory Committee on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction marks that a turning point has been reached in relation to the future of 
the oceans. Time is of the essence, and negotiations should be conducted in a spirit 
of cooperation. It is hoped that by 2018 a new legal instrument should have been 
created and universally acceptable and implementable to preserve our mother sea.
The ocean commons is particularly difficult to manage. It is hard to monitor 
what is done in this vast and often unfriendly space, owned by no State and far 
from view. Given this difficulty, international institutions managing maritime issues 
have done a surprisingly effective job in changing the way ships are built and 
operated. The IMO has developed a wide range of international agreements that 
have led to increased safety of and decreased pollution from ships. Many of the 
institutions created under the law of the sea are still recent and evolving, but have, 
for those States that accept their mandates, shown sign of effective governance. 
At minimum, they have changed the way the oceans are governed internationally. 
How well they fare over time, and whether UNCLOS can help remedy some of the 
difficulties with maritime governance, remains to be seen. 
In consideration of current ocean governance regimes and threats to marine 
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, this article is convinced that sustainable 
development of our earth depends on remarkable approach to the management of 
the oceans. Firstly, sufficient human and financial resources should be allocated to 
oceans commons management. Secondly, the UNCLOS provisions, especially those 
relating to marine environment, should be advanced. Thirdly, a holistic approach 
should be adopted, based on international cooperation, to ocean governance. 
Cohesive international action is paramount when it comes to the management of 
the ocean commons beyond national jurisdiction. Preserving the oceans should go 
beyond mere rhetoric and frenzied international conferences and resolutions. The 
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international community of nations must wake up to its responsibility to provide 
sustainable mechanisms in tackling the challenges of oceans management. 
